

Reconstruction and Stabilization: Civilian Response

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) U.S. Department of State

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I. Introduction

The Conference Report (House Report 108-792) accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Div. B), P.L. 108-447) directed the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to "*provide a report to the Committee on the desirability and feasibility of establishing a response entity that can provide assistance in support of stabilization and reconstruction activities overseas in the event of conflict or civil strife. The report should make recommendations on whether and why such an entity is needed. If the Office determines that such a response entity is necessary, the report should include recommendations on which agency the entity should be established under, or whether the entity should be independent; what the mission and authorities of this entity should be; what the operating budget of this entity should be; how many personnel should participate in this entity and what functions they should perform; what expertise these personnel should have; and the circumstances in which this entity should be deployed. The Office shall submit, for the consideration the relevant authorizing Committees, any legislation that may be necessary to implement the proposed recommendations.*"

This report describes the response mechanisms and operational models that S/CRS is developing within existing authorities and legislation to ensure that the U.S. Government (USG) has the structures, capabilities, and resources in place *before* an emergency occurs in order to mount a rapid, efficient, and successful response. The report also reviews the current status of analysis for the development of a new civilian reserve mechanism that could tap skills and capabilities outside the USG.

II. Rationale

Weak and failed states and those emerging from conflict pose one of today's greatest security challenges. States are most vulnerable to collapse in the time immediately before, during, and after conflict. Ungoverned spaces become breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, weapons proliferation, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes and can destabilize an entire region. Subjected to dire conditions and deprived of basic services, people become susceptible to the exhortations of demagogues and hate-mongers. It was in such circumstances that in 2001 the second poorest country in the world, Afghanistan, became the base for the deadliest attack ever on the U.S. homeland.

“When chaos, corruption and cruelty reign they can pose threats to their neighbors, to their regions, and to the entire world. And so we are working to strengthen international capacities to address conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict states.”

– Secretary Rice, May 12, 2005 (SFRC hearing)

The international community is not, however, adequately organized to deal with governance failures. The United States and its partners must organize themselves in a way that addresses this security challenge head on by committing to make long-term investments of money, energy, and expertise.

The most significant lesson is that we must have a strong civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability in order to provide assistance that will achieve a sustainable peace. Sustainable peace is reached when the conflict transformation process has sufficiently diminished the means and motivations for conflict and sufficiently developed local institutional capacity such that international actors can pass the lead to local actors, though usually providing continued assistance, without the country falling back into conflict.

Civilian capabilities are needed to plan and work in tandem with U.S. military forces when they are engaged in combat or peacekeeping operations. This will allow the military to concentrate on those activities for which they should be responsible. We need to have a partnership – a partnership in planning that begins at the outset and is interlinked all the way through training, exercises, and finally the process of stabilization and reconstruction. A civilian capability for stabilization and reconstruction is needed as well for those situations where there is no military combat role but where the United States engages because it is in our security interests to assist a failing state.

Based on trends over the last decade, the United States must have the capacity to conduct and manage several concurrent stabilization and reconstruction operations. The task is to develop a civilian response capability that is agile, flexible, and scaleable and which operates from a reliable and institutionalized management structure rather than ad hoc arrangements.

“The United States must have the right structures, capabilities, people, and resources in place before an emergency occurs in order to mount a speedy, efficient, and successful response.”

- *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Report 2*
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Lessons learned from past conflicts underscore the need for the USG to get programs deployed quickly in the immediate aftermath of hostilities and to fill critical gaps in

governance and service delivery in order to create the climate of stability and confidence needed to sustain peace, democracy, and economic growth. Having personnel on the ground early also allows the USG to influence an international mission, and leverage international responses.

During the initial deployment, personnel may be required to enforce order, feed people, restart basic services, initiate a political transition process, generate local employment, and reintegrate returning refugees and internally displaced persons. Subsequently, they will phase out of “doing” and begin “enabling” local people to assume the tasks of governance. The faster and more effectively the United States responds, the better the prospects for success and, for saving U.S. lives and money. Bringing one U.S. military division home from Iraq just one month early would save about \$1.2 billion – and remove soldiers from harm’s way.

III. Creation of S/CRS

Preventing or addressing internal conflict abroad has become a mainstream part of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Current efforts aim to bring management structures up to date with recent experience.

The Department of State established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the direction of NSC Principals to coordinate U.S. reconstruction and stabilization planning, conflict prevention efforts, and response activities across federal agencies. Under Secretary Rice, S/CRS has become a leading agent in advancing the agenda of “Transformational Diplomacy.”

“We must also improve the responsiveness of our government to help nations emerging from tyranny and war...[O]ur government must be able to move quickly to provide needed assistance. So last summer, my administration established a new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department.”

– President George W. Bush
May 18, 2005
International Republican Institute

The core functions of S/CRS are to focus attention on preventative measures and planning for countries at risk of instability, identify and plan responses to post-conflict situations, lead and manage civilian response teams in the field and in Washington, and coordinate USG participation in multilateral operations. S/CRS is coordinating interagency efforts to integrate civilian and military planning, and is providing interagency leadership on: monitoring of potential states in crisis; assessing lessons learned and integrating them into operations and planning; supporting budget requests for capacity-building; recommending resource allocations for a response; developing and managing civilian standby capabilities for deployment; and coordinating with international partners.

S/CRS is focused on managing complex interagency responses that address a range of transitional needs and where coordinated efforts are particularly needed in the first intensive years before management functions transition to traditional structures. These engagements include peacekeeping operations, post-crisis or post-conflict engagements, and U.S. military interventions. Basic humanitarian relief operations – the Indian ocean tsunami or the South Asian earthquake – are primarily USAID missions and will not be led by S/CRS.

Mission:

The office will lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

For U.S. civilians to operate effectively in a post-conflict environment there must be unity of effort, and interoperability in planning and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization operations across U.S. agencies. During the past twelve months, S/CRS has been working across the interagency community, including with the Department of Defense, and with our international partners to respond to the critical need for an improved rapid response civilian capability to conduct post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts, for coordinated efforts across the range of USG departments and agencies, for joint civil-military operations, and for improved planning and exercising, including in the deployment of civilian surge personnel. Specific examples include:

- Development of a common interagency planning framework for reconstruction and stabilization operations, enabling joint planning among military and civilian agencies and providing a template, tools and process to define major mission elements and resource requirements; the framework is now an “experimental pamphlet” of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) which is being reviewed for adoption by the military, and across USG civilian agencies;
- Establishment of an interagency Policy Coordinating Committee on stabilization and reconstruction;
- Support for creation of a UN Peacebuilding Commission to assist countries in the transition from Peacekeeping Operations to longer-term stabilization and reconstruction; establishment of the Commission is one of the top priorities of the USG at the UN this year;
- Working with allies to encourage NATO to add planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction to the agenda for their 2006 Transformation Summit
- Creation of seven S/CRS led interagency working groups to address: transitional security and rule of law; governance and political transitions; infrastructure

development and economic reconstruction; humanitarian assistance; conflict prevention; monitoring, analysis, intelligence; and resources management;

- Increased coordination with the Department of Defense, including several major exercises we are leading with combatant commands on stabilization and reconstruction;
- Initiated creation of an operational database of existing pre-positioned USG-wide assistance capabilities for reconstruction and stabilization operations that will be used in the planning effort;
- Temporary assignment of up to six DoD senior military staff to S/CRS to assist in development and exercising of S/CRS operational models and the planning framework;
- S/CRS-led civilian participation in four significant military planning exercises;
- Collaborating with Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, National Defense University, the Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operation's Institute, the National Defense University's Security Strategy and Policy Division, the Foreign Service Institute and the U.S. Institute of Peace on a variety of studies, conferences and initiatives to improve planning, training and best practices in reconstruction and stabilization operations; and
- Frequent dialogue with S/CRS' sister agencies in the UK, Australia, Canada, and the European Union on planning models, and civilian response capabilities.

S/CRS Country Engagements

Consistent with transformational diplomacy, S/CRS recognizes the need to balance the long-term institutional reform critical to address a pressing national security challenge, and the need to create change on the ground now. The collaborative work with our interagency, and international partners is yielding dividends for our work on Sudan and Haiti.

S/CRS has led the planning efforts for USG efforts in Sudan and Haiti in concert with Regional Bureaus in the Department of State and with the support of partner bureaus and agencies. These interagency processes have brought together strategic guidance and resources to address conflict transformation goals. In Sudan, S/CRS has brought together an overall U.S. Government strategy for USG efforts on humanitarian assistance in Darfur and the South; for peace and stability in Darfur; for the transformation of the SPLA in the South; to work with the Government of National Unity; on the capacity-building and economic and reconstruction activities in the South; on development of the rule of law; and on preparing a capacity to respond to flashpoints throughout the country. This strategy is linked to resources and is providing the Administration the ability to assess needs and gaps in a comprehensive manner.

In Haiti, S/CRS has led contingency planning to address the challenges beyond election day for effective governance, security, and quick impact programs to create jobs and address core social issues. S/CRS has also worked closely with the Haiti Core Group at the UN to coordinate UN and international efforts.

IV. Components of an Effective Response

“One of the lessons we learned from our experience in Iraq is that, while military personnel can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world, the same is not true of U.S. government civilians.”

- President George W. Bush
May 18, 2005
International Republican Institute

Effectively managing post-conflict efforts requires coordination of skills, resources, and policy attention in Washington, with international partners, in the region, and on the ground. A combination of these core functions – coordination, diplomacy, and implementation – and skills from within the USG and outside it will be needed in Washington and in the field to successfully lead, coordinate, plan and implement a U.S. reconstruction and stabilization strategy.

The chart below describes the key functions and sources of personnel that would fulfill those functions during a USG post-conflict response. The following sections of this paper elaborate on the approach and capabilities proposed to achieve these core functions.

Response Mechanisms and Functions: Coordinated Responsibilities

	Mechanism– SUPPLY Function – DEMAND	S/CRS Staff	State Response Corps (Embassy)	Other USG Agencies & Bureaus	Civilian Reserve	Global Skills Network (USG contracts, etc.)
Coordination	Civilian Planning	Lead	Supplement	Participate	Supplement	Supplement
	Washington Coordination	Lead	Supplement	Participate	Supplement	Supplement
Diplomacy	Field Diplomacy	Coordinate	Lead	Participate	Participate	Supplement
	Program Mgmt. & Design	Coordinate	Participate	Lead	Participate	Supplement
Implement- ation	Program Delivery	Monitor	Supplement	Lead/Monitor Contractors	Rapid Response	Sustained Effort

Participate = Participate regularly; Supplement = May provide individuals

V. Leadership and Coordination

NSC Principals designated the State Department to be the focal point for managing the planning, coordination, and deployment of civilian response capabilities in order to fill gaps in the USG civilian response and implementation.

S/CRS Staff

Washington management of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction will require a strong, unified interagency effort led by S/CRS staff that focuses the necessary skills, resources, and policy attention on countries emerging from conflict and civil strife. S/CRS staff will facilitate the planning and the monitoring process, coordinate the management in Washington and create a capacity for coordination in the field, take the leadership role in outreach to the international community, and develop an institutional memory by extracting lessons learned and injecting that back into the S/CRS operation.

Specific ongoing responsibilities of S/CRS staff are to:

- Develop deployment capabilities and rosters, and deployment mechanisms with the military;
- Lead interagency processes to monitor instability, managing planning, exercises, and relationships with the military;
- Develop and oversee programs for training of specific skills;
- Create and maintain a lessons-learned capacity that is systematic and institutionalize lessons in our operations;
- Lead crisis prevention exercises;
- Manage resources through tracking, reporting, and financial controls; and
- Serve as a focal point within the USG to engage other countries and international organizations on stabilization and reconstruction.

During management of a specific country response, S/CRS staff would:

- Establish and lead an interagency management group with regional and functional skills to provide leadership and integration of effort;
- Develop the strategic framework for response;
- Synchronize and integrate interagency efforts;
- Monitor and report;
- Form the core of teams deployed to the field to help develop the overall strategy;
- Deploy to bolster planning capacity at Regional Combatant Command;
- Deploy with military;

- Lead initial assessments in the field and support the Embassy, if one is in place; and
- Manage surge from State and other agencies and private sector.


Such work will also involve ensuring that agencies' program plans support overall USG policy goals, are mutually reinforcing, and synchronized to fill gaps and eliminate overlap.

In an effort to institutionalize the participation of key agencies in decision making and planning of reconstruction and stabilization operations, NSC Principals in December 2004 endorsed the S/CRS plans to form interagency teams for situations in which the USG must respond comprehensively to a failed or failing state:

- A Washington-based interagency decision-making body and planning staff – Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group (CRSG);
- An interagency, civilian planning cell located at the appropriate Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) – Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST); and
- Advance Civilian Teams (ACT), to provide a rapidly deployable, integrated, interagency field presence.

When utilized, these teams will address the management gaps that have been identified through lessons-learned and that led to the creation of S/CRS. The purpose of each team is to meet the challenges of developing and implementing a coordinated, comprehensive, integrated USG response. They will add value to existing functions, providing ways to integrate efforts rather than duplicate them; some changes in institutional arrangements will be needed to ensure effective management of operations. Some adaptation of the teams to specific situations is to be expected, and they will evolve based on experimentation and experience. By preparing these approaches in advance in general terms and gaining interagency agreement on the functions, staffing, and processes, the USG will be better able to establish these structures early in a crisis to respond quickly.

The following chart illustrates the relationship and communication flows among the CRSG, HRST, ACTs and standing USG decision-making bodies. The sections following the chart describe each of the operational models in greater detail.



CRSG

The CRSG is designed to serve as the single interagency coordination unit that will bring together both policy and operational expertise from all relevant agencies to address the full range of issues associated with a USG engagement to address a conflict challenge or complex contingency.

When deemed necessary the National Security Council will establish a *Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG)* that brings together country and technical experts to plan and manage U.S. post-conflict responses. Regional bureaus will provide the country and bi-lateral policy expertise and designate a policy director. S/CRS will ensure that the CRSG draws together the skills needed from the interagency community and builds on experience and best practices. The CRSG will provide policy guidance and planning oversight, advise the Deputies Committee, and oversee deployment of interagency teams of technical experts to support and facilitate delivery of assistance on the ground in concert with any military or multilateral intervention. A standing staff and associated interagency working groups will provide support to the group and conduct planning.

HRST

The Humanitarian Reconstruction Stabilization Team will be deployed in an emerging crisis scenario requiring significant U.S. military forces and intervention, and which will entail a stabilization and reconstruction mission. With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the HRST could also be established and used in other contexts, such as supporting a UN peacekeeping operation or in the context of a multilateral planning mission.

The Humanitarian Reconstruction Stabilization Team is a scalable, civilian led interagency stability and reconstruction planning team that embeds into a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) planning staff. The HRST has three principle functions: 1) to assist the GCC staff within their own military planning process; 2) provide the core foundations for a stabilization and reconstruction strategy to the Washington-based CRSG, and; 3) develop the concept of operations for deployment of the Advanced Civilian Teams (ACT). The HRST is a planning element only and has no command and control functions.

The HRST would be formed to provide support to the GCC and to the interagency planning effort when the President has requested a specific military contingency plan for a developing crisis and an interagency CRSG has been established. The HRST would remain embedded at the GCC until such time as the locus of planning shifts to subordinate headquarters and normal military functions can fully support the GCC planning requirements.

The HRST concept was recently tested and exercised in a classified military exercise. The relevant Geographic Combatant Commander praised the involvement of S/CRS in the exercise for helping to raise a number of policy issues that, otherwise, would not have been considered.

VI. Diplomacy

U.S. Mission Staff

A decade of operational experiences in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq has shown vividly that nothing substitutes for a civilian field presence in the very first stages of a reconstruction and stabilization mission, both to inform Washington of the situation and to shape the tactical-level environment for follow-on civilian elements. Field personnel are needed to conduct the critical diplomatic functions on the ground. In some cases, a U.S. mission will not be present and will need to be established. In other cases, the mission will need to be augmented with additional personnel to address the increased workload of a reconstruction and stabilization operation.

At present, there is no standing group with a mix of skills to participate in peace negotiations, assess humanitarian needs, establish embassy operations, manage staff security, develop relations with transitional governments and other political actors,

coordinate with the U.S. military, liaise with international organizations and NGOs on the ground, and advise on transitional economic policies. While State has many people with these skills, they must be drawn from existing jobs, causing gaps in other operations.

To remedy this, S/CRS is establishing a *Response Corps*, made up of members from the State Department's Foreign and Civil Services. The *Active Response Corps* (ARC) will be the first responders when the State Department must establish a transitional or post-conflict ground operation, such as an interim embassy or U.S. office. Members of the ARC will be a select, dedicated, full-time, specially-trained group for short-notice deployment in reconstruction and stabilization operations, with or without U.S. military forces, and possibly in conjunction with or attached to a UN or international mission. ARC members may be required to support an embassy, work in military headquarters or units, launch a diplomatic presence in the field, or to serve in an international coalition office. When not deployed, ARC personnel will be in training, in USG exercises, or in State bureaus providing critical support to preparing and planning for countries/regions facing R&S challenges, where efforts have been under resourced.

A complement to the ARC is a *Standby Response Corps* (SRC), both to supplement the skills of the ARC as it deploys and to follow on after the initial deployment to support a country's longer-term transition. SRC members are pre-screened volunteers within the Department who continue to perform their current duties in the Department or overseas, with the understanding that depending on need and their skills, they could be called upon for an R&S mission on approx. 30-60 days' notice, in Washington or overseas, for service of 365 days – or longer in some circumstances. The staffing plan is to fill 10 ARC, and 100 SRC positions by February 2006, when a program of training and exercises is to begin. By summer 2006, the ARC is to expand to 15 and the SRC to 300. Significant movement toward the President's target level of a 100-person ARC will depend on additional funding.

In addition to the Department of State's diplomatic functions, the USG must be able to tap within its ranks individuals with the expertise to design and manage stabilization and reconstruction activities in key sectors. USG personnel are often available sooner than contracted personnel and, thus, can serve to conduct assessments and design appropriate projects with host country counterparts for follow-on contractors to implement. This added capacity to assess, design and deploy should reside in the various agencies and bureaus that currently manage programs across the spectrum of stabilization and reconstruction activities. This includes functional State Bureaus (such as International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and Population, Refugees and Migration), as well as Justice, Treasury and USAID. As program managers they have the most detailed knowledge of the resources that can be marshaled in their areas and are therefore best placed to take on these additional functions. USAID is already taking steps to strengthen its first-responder cadres, and S/CRS is working with other partner agencies to develop analogous capabilities within their ranks.

Advance Civilian Teams

The concept of Advance Civilian Teams (ACT) is based on experience that decentralized operational capabilities, immediate civilian presence, and integrated interagency capabilities are essential to address variable field realities in post-conflict situations. In most post-conflict environments, political, economic and security conditions can change quickly. The more decentralized the U.S. presence, the greater the potential to understand these changed environments and the greater likelihood that USG responses will be appropriate and effective. The ACT mechanism will improve USG efforts to address destabilizing countries by synthesizing the currently fragmented USG efforts.

“ [T]he primary purpose of our military is to win our nation's wars....However, those of us in uniform are acutely aware of the limits of traditional military power. Enhancing our post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction capabilities is important in our ability to be able to prevail.”

– Lt. Gen. Skip Sharp, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff, J-5
SFRC hearing, June 16, 2005

The ACTs will be available to deploy immediately – including embedded with the U.S. military if deployed – to begin working on reconstruction and stabilization activities necessary to set conditions for long-term state viability. The ACTs will improve interagency coordination on the ground but will not replace other existing USG response teams. They will be comprised of members drawn from the Interagency, including members of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, and Disaster Assistance Response Team, and will build upon work that may already have been undertaken by members of USG agencies already deployed, international organizations and other donors. ACTs will operate in key locations outside the capital, reporting to the Advanced Civilian Team Headquarters. Field activities to be conducted by the ACTs include: setting up peace negotiations; coordinating with international and local actors developing transition strategy; facilitating transitional governance arrangements; encouraging conflicting factions to work together; developing strategies to promote transitional security; coordinating with other USG agencies and the U.S. military; coordinating with foreign agencies and armed forces; and setting up a base for an embassy or embassy office. The HQ also will be able to augment the operations of the Embassy and USAID.

VII. Implementation

The final element of the response function is long-term implementation of assistance programs. In organizing USG implementation of a comprehensive reconstruction and stabilization program, there is no one-size-fits-all system; rather, the system must be designed to be agile, flexible, and scalable. Precedents abound in innovative and effective staffing, but many have been ad hoc. The challenge is to fit these elements into a coherent framework – to make the pieces work together and to fill gaps and address weaknesses – so that the USG has a system that is more reliable, responsive, prepared and coordinated. In building such a framework, S/CRS has sought to create a seamless unity of effort across the interagency and from Washington to the field.

The fundamental requirement to stabilize and reconstruct places a premium on fast delivery of effective results. Too slow a response risks missing a crucial early window of opportunity. Heretofore, S/CRS has worked to maximize and improve the deployment of civilian personnel to support reconstruction and stabilization operations through existing laws and authorities. The creation of Advanced Civilian Teams, and the Active and Standby Response Corps provide the USG with added capabilities in the field to support diplomacy and program management and design. In an effort to further reduce delays in implementing reconstruction and stabilization programs, S/CRS is creating a Global Skills Network of pre-positioned contracts and sector experts, and a standby corps of trained and equipped civilians.

Global Skills Network

To carry out and sustain over a multi-year period the bulk of reconstruction and stabilization activities, agencies will still turn to institutional contracts and similar arrangements with implementing partners for technical assistance, program implementation, and support. While the network of skills available through such contractual mechanisms is broad, some gaps remain and many vehicles require a long lead time. Accordingly, S/CRS is working with other USG agencies to strengthen and expand the range of pre-positioned global funding mechanisms across key areas such as transitional security, the rule of law, infrastructure, economics, humanitarian assistance, and governance and participation. The intent of this Global Skills Network (GSN) is to pre-identify generic requirements and pre-position indefinite quantity arrangements in order to minimize the amount of new contracting required during a crisis. As a first step, S/CRS is creating an operational database to help inventory existing expert and contract capabilities and is working with partner agencies to populate it, and to expand the number of contracts available to support reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Civilian Reserves

Notwithstanding the benefits provided by a Global Skills Network, an additional standby USG civilian capability to “jumpstart” stabilization and reconstruction programs, especially in the critical areas of security, justice, and infrastructure, would greatly enhance the speed and quality of reconstruction and stabilization operations. While the

U.S. military is unmatched in terms of its effectiveness, capabilities, and reach, the USG lacks a standing, deployable civilian capacity for stability operations that could fill the critical time lag between the arrival of U.S. diplomats and deployment of contracted program implementers.

In response, S/CRS is in the process of completing a feasibility study for a civilian reserve. As conceived, the civilian reserve would provide the USG with a cadre of permanent, readily available, trained civilian specialists that would design and implement reconstruction and stabilization programs. The reserve would complement USG civilian agency capacity, provide a “just in time” surge capability that is more cost-effective than adding permanent USG staff, be inherently flexible to adjust the size of deployment and the mix of specialists to fit the situation, provide the military with a civilian counterpart to phase down, and address the inherent problems of delays, reliability and command/control that are found with contracting networks.

Reservists would be recruited from federal, state, local governments, and the private sector, in the fields of security, rule of law, essential services, and civil administration. Members of the reserve would serve in the reserve for a period of five years but remain in their current jobs until activated for annual training or deployment, at which time they would become USG employees. They would be available for deployment within 30 days of call-up, could be deployed for up to one year, would be followed by contract personnel who would augment the work of the reserves and eventually replace them on the ground.

The creation of the reserves would likely require additional legislative authorities to provide reservists with reemployment rights, and resources to recruit, train and equip them. Based on the results of the feasibility study under way, the Administration will determine whether to seek the necessary funding and authorities in FY07.

VIII. Resources

We have learned the importance of having an effective capacity to mobilize and deploy in both Washington and overseas and have the people that are necessary to be able to do that. Training, planning, exercises, and effective mechanisms for deployment are essential to our success. In the model that we propose, we have analyzed the capabilities that we need inside of the government, the capabilities that we need in our external partners, and the resources that are necessary to make this all work and operate together. While we will utilize the skills and resources of existing programs and personnel in partner Bureaus, Departments, and Agencies to plan and respond, there are additional resources needed to fill key gaps and to make those existing elements work effectively and to speed response efforts. The first phase request focused on building core leadership, coordination and response capabilities in the Department of State and providing baseline funding to support rapid field responses essential to creating positive dynamics for successful reconstruction and stabilization operations. As we learn lessons from this phase on operational requirements and resource needs, we will factor these lessons into redefining our operational models and future requests to make them effective. We will consult with the Congress throughout this process.

Coordination and Leadership

These efforts require sustained leadership, effective coordination, and adequate resources. We would not expect our military to go without the resources for planning, coordination, exercising, training, and concept development or without a capacity to surge to respond to a crisis; but we expect civilian agencies to do so. The military has not only the ability to use its forces that are not deployed to primary missions for those purposes, but it also explicitly budgets for additional people and funding (e.g. the Army's mandated 13 percent additional billets to account for absences due to training, transfers, etc) because it considers those preparatory activities central to its effectiveness. In addition to the services which provide the forces, the military has a Joint Staff to perform central coordination and planning. Civilian agency personnel are all engaged in their primary mission leaving no capacity for surge other than to reprioritize and leave other work neglected. We have to change the way we and the Congress think about the requirements. Personnel for management of coordination processes and planning are not a luxury; training and exercising is not an option but a necessity.

The funding received in FY06 will support S/CRS operations and facilitate the initiation of an Active Response Corps in the Department of State. To lead and coordinate USG efforts requires a dedicated core staff. S/CRS will play this role and act as a force multiplier. Our overall goal is to have an office of 80 to manage Washington responsibilities. While we will continue to seek interagency staffing, the resources to reimburse agencies will ensure that we can establish longer-term assignments and the best candidates.

The funding received in FY06 will also allow us to initiate a 15 member Active Response Corps pilot program from within the Department's overall personnel increase. Our ultimate goal is a corps of 100 people within the State Department, both Foreign and Civil Service employees with a mix of skills.

Finally, in FY06, we will develop training programs for staff working in reconstruction and stabilization operations, develop IT systems to support planning, host prevention exercises on countries at risk of instability, and participate in development and execution of military exercises focused on post-conflict periods. These efforts are central to institutionalizing the capacity to build on lessons learned.

In the out-years, we will seek resources to stabilize office staffing, develop a fully-prepared Active Response Corps at levels commensurate with the anticipated deployment needs, train and exercise all associated staff expected to deploy, develop a standby capability in a "reserve" system for additional capacity that is on-call, and provide for rapid deployment capabilities.

Program Implementation

In addition to having the people that are necessary to manage and monitor and ensure that there is an effective response, there is a requirement to mobilize and deploy quickly. All outside experts concerned about civilian capacity to respond have emphasized a need for appropriate funding mechanisms that will allow rapid response in the earliest days when opportunities are greatest to influence the dynamics on the ground. It will be critical to ensure Congressional oversight through notifications and consultations while providing funding that is available for rapid response without having to reprogram from existing scarce resources.

To be able to mobilize such resources quickly, we have been pursuing a \$100 million Conflict Response Fund that would support initial program activities in a crisis situation. While the final appropriation did not include funding for this account, Congressional interest in ensuring adequate response was clear in the Senate's support of \$74 million in funding and the House's support for \$100 million in transfer authority. While the proposed Fund is not enough to address a full conflict transformation effort, it would give us sufficient resources for an initial investment upfront to target a key sector, for example, the development of indigenous police forces while we are deploying international civilian police and rule of law experts – that we can get that process of change on transitional security moving upfront. The resources would fund activities that are in support of the overall strategic plan developed by the interagency under S/CRS leadership and submitted for approval to NSC; these activities will be undertaken by agencies through their own implementation contracts and grants, providing start-up money. This gives us then time to work with the Congress and across the interagency community to find where we can obtain the additional resources necessary to support the full stabilization and reconstruction operation.

This funding would not be a “slush fund” but rather a pre-positioning of resources that are spent eventually in any case without requiring the difficult and lengthy process of reprogramming and supplemental requests. Such an account would fund programs that promote stability, advance the rule of law, facilitate transitional governance and political legitimacy, and address immediate social and economic needs. These programs funds would normally be spent in the course of a post-conflict response. The difference in making them available quickly is that they would:

- Influence the dynamic and viability of post-conflict operations;
- Maximize impact of USG interagency instruments;
- Leverage matching international responses; and
- Allow time to seek other long-term funding mechanisms through regular budget processes, such as reprogramming and supplemental requests.

To use the fund, the Secretary of State would be required to determine that a post-conflict response is in our national interest, consulting with the Congress and sending notifications when resources from the Fund are required.

We need to have both rapid mechanisms for initiating programs as well as rapidly deployable people to perform the technical assistance and other services on the ground. In order to improve the options for response, we must put in place those mechanisms with firms, individuals, NGOs, think-thanks, universities, and provide resources to train individuals as necessary. We need to have sufficient pre-positioned global funding mechanisms (such as indefinite quantity contracts) in a range of key areas such as transitional security, the rule-of-law, infrastructure, humanitarian transition, economics, governance and participation, so we do not have to start the contracting process and the competition during a crisis, delaying our response. In cases where it is particularly important to have a common doctrine and common training, we need to do that in advance. We would use a small portion of the funding in Conflict Response to prepare response efforts by creating additional contract mechanisms to fill key gaps.

As we continue the analysis of whether it would make sense to have something in the civilian world that is akin to the military reserve which could include different skills that might extend the base of constabulary police, judges, civil administrators, city planners, economists and other skills, we will assess whether it's more cost effective to obtain those skills through a reserve or through a contract or other roster mechanism and will request funding to initiate a reserve program.

IX. Conclusion

The nature of foreign policy has shifted and the challenges and threats to our country have changed. Increasingly, threats to peace emerge within nations, not between them. On September 11, we learned tragically how closely our nation's security is tied to the success or failure of other societies. In a world where threats pass even through the most fortified boundaries, weak and poorly governed states enable disease to spread undetected and corruption to multiply unchecked and hateful ideologies to grow more violent and more vengeful.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was created to enhance coordination of USG efforts to prevent and respond to conflict and to strengthen our ability to coordinate with partners. While we must aim to prevent conflicts from erupting, where that does not succeed, we must plan for stabilization and reconstruction in the aftermath of war and civil strife – and we must prepare the necessary resources to so do.

We owe it to our troops, to the American people, to our national prestige, and to those around the world who struggle to emerge from conflict, to improve our capabilities. The operational models and mechanisms described above will enable the USG to deliver a fast, effective, and well coordinated civilian response to protect our security and make an investment in the transformation of societies that will make them more stable and

peaceful, and allow more people to enjoy the benefits of peace, democracy and market economies.